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Abstract The purpose of this article is to present an analysis of the cost
inefficiency of public regulation of input factors. During the data period used
here, individual plants within the Norwegian fish farming industry were regu-
lated in their use of production capacity (pen volume) at different size levels.
Given the regulation of production capacity, it is likely that farms will be
forced to operate off their expansion paths resulting in two types of regulating
effects: misallocation of variable input factors (an input misallocation effect),
and failure to exploit economics of scale (a scale effect). A restricted cost
function, which invokes the assumption of cost minimization given the level of
the fixed factor, was specified to measure the effects of regulation on input
allocation and on scale economies.
The results indicate that variable inputs are more intensively used for
farms which are most heavily regulated. Furthermore, in a comparison of
results on economies of scale properties estimated by a total long-run cost
function with the present restricted cost function, an upward bias of scale
economies was indicated for the total cost function approach.
Keywords Public regulation, input factor misallocation, restricted cost func-
tion, aquaculture economics.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to present an analysis of the cost of public regulation
of input factors in terms of cost inefficiency. The methodology used is applied to
the Norwegian fish farming industry for a specific data period during which the
individual plants' use of production capacity was regulated. Capacity was defined
as pen volume or cubic meters of water for fish cultivation, and was licensed at
different size levels. Fish farms can freely adjust other factors of production.
Given the regulation of water volume capacity for cultivating fish, it is likely that
farms in this industry will be forced to operate off their expansion paths, resulting
in two types of regulation effects: misallocation of the variable input factors (an
input misallocation effect), and failure to exploit economies of scale (a scale
effect).
By specifying a restricted cost function or a partial equilibrium model which
invokes the assumption of cost minimization given the level of the fixed factor, it
is possible to measure the effect of regulation on input allocation and the effect on
scale economies in this case. It is expected a priori that the regulation of capacity
increases variable costs at any output level and this is measured by the point
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elasticity of cost with respect to capacity retrieved from the estimated restricted
cost function. In addition, the effect, if any, of a change in capacity on the shares
of variable factors are also tested. This is undertaken by calculating the elasticities
of factor demand with respect to the regulated factor in order to measure whether
variable factors are used too intensely when the production capacity is regulated.
If the displacement effect on the cost function is important, it is also expected
that a measure of scale economies will be biased when estimating a long-run cost
function in which the effect of a fixed factor is not incorporated. Another impor-
tant effect is thus a possible underutilization of gains from scale economies since
capacity—the given factor—is not allowed to adjust along the long-run cost func-
tion. This is an effect that concerns optimal adjustment of capacity and has to do
with the total cost function. In general, specifying a restricted cost or production
function for a production process where cross-section data is utilized, is prefer-
able since it is likely that some factors of production are quasi-fixed, i.e., given
within the period of the data set, or fixed, as in this particular case, given even
beyond the data period. Specifying long-run cost function may be to misspecify
the technology in these cases and may result in biased estimates of economies of
scale and elasticities of substitution (Caves, Christensen and Swanson, 1981,
Braeutigam and Daughety, 1983, Nelson, 1985, Schankerman and Nadiri, 1986).
This aspect of cost function estimation will also be addressed in that the elasticity
of scale retrieved from the restricted cost function will be compared to the elas-
ticity from an alternative estimated long-run cost function.
The second section presents a short description of the production process and
the public regulation, and the production model of the industry is specified. In
third section the econometric model is given together with the different measures
of the effects of regulation. A brief description of the data set and the definitions
of variables are given in the fourth section. The fifth section presents and dis-
cusses the empirical results and in the sixth section concluding comments are
given.
Aquaculture Production
When a salmon aquaculture firm produces salmon of market size measured in
tons, y, the production process can be represented by the following production
function:
y = f(xL, Xp, XK, XS, XM) (1)
where XL, Xp, x^, Xg and x^ denote the input of labor, feed, regulated production
capacity, smolts (small salmon ready for sea water farming) and material inputs.
The production process represented by equation (1) incorporates both the biolog-
ical production system where smolts is put into the sea and where feed as an input
infiuences the biomass weight of fish in the sea pens, and the physical system
comprising factors such as labour, capital equipment (capacity) and other mate-
rials.'
Reproduction in aquaculture is accomplished by buying a new cohort (year-
class) offish every year. In a "normal year", when a salmon farm is in equilib-
' See Bj0mdal (1988) and Amasson (1990) for bioeconomic models offish farms where
input of smolts and feed are the factors of production in the biological models.52 Salvanes
Hum, a Norwegian salmon farmer has three year-classes of salmon in the pens in
order to maintain continuous production. Given the distinct characteristics con-
cerning reproduction and the dynamic aspects of aquacuiture, some further com-
ments are required on the variable definitions and the production function spec-
ification.
The level of production is defined as both the actual harvest of the year, i.e.,
sales, plus the change in the stock offish from the beginning of the year to the end
of the year. Mortality is also corrected for. The dynamic aspects of aquacuiture
production are reflected in this definition, which implies that a proportion of
salmon is not sold in a given year but held for harvesting in the following year.
Given this harvesting procedure, production consists of the quantity slaughtered
and the net change in stock of living fish in the pens. A second point pertaining to
the definition of the level of production requires some comment. A considerable
majority of fish farms are multiproduct farms in the sense that they produce both
salmon and rainbow trout. However, rainbow trout is a minor species relative to
salmon, i.e., the trout's share of production has varied between 20 and 5 percent
(5 percent in 1988). Rainbow trout is a species very similar to salmon and the same
kind of production technology, i.e., pens, feed etc., is utilized for culturing trout
as for salmon. The main reason for fish farms to raise trout in addition to salmon
when the Norwegian aquacuiture industry was expanding rapidly, i.e., at a. rate of
50 percent increase in production annually, has been that in some years trout was
more easily available. Hence, it appears that the reason for raising trout in addi-
tion to salmon has been a production scaling problem for the individual farmer.
Data on the production levels and values is not available for each species indi-
vidually, only a simple aggregate in tons is available. As salmon is the predomi-
nant product in this particular industry and trout is of little importance, utilizing
an aggregate function as an output measure of the two products is a priori not
expected to be a problem. However, when a single variable is used for a multi-
product firm, jointness in production and separability of outputs from inputs are
incurred (McFadden, 1978, Squires, 1987a, 1987b). Input-output separability im-
plies that the marginal rates of substitution between input pairs are independent of
the composition of the output mix of salmon and trout. Jointness in production
means that common inputs exist that are not possible to allocate to individual
products. Hence, a separate production process is not assumed, it is basically the
same production process. This ^eems to be a fair representation of the Norwegian
Aquacuiture industry where the same type of pens for grow-out are used and the
inputs required are the same. Furthermore, any cross-effect between the two
outputs in terms of cost efficiency of producing two outputs together as compared
to producing the two species separately in terms of economies of scope is not
expected. Any cost efficiency of producing both products is expected to be cap-
tured by the elasticity of scale since the reason for producing both species basi-
cally is to scale the production up for the individual farmer. Data is not available
for testing these properties, though it is possible, in principle, within a framework
of flexible functional forms.^
^ Input-output separability (one output, i.e., harvest, representing a diversity of outputs)
and input-output separability with input-homotheticity (both assuming one output and one
input, i.e., fishing effort) is quite common in the fisheries literature, both in theoretical and
empirical studies. However, lately, attempts have been made to test for these representa-Cost of Public Regulation in Fish Farming 53
There is good reason to consider smolts as an input factor which is different
from the other factors. At the start of each year, when one determines output
(through harvesting) and the optimal use of inputs, the corresponding decision on
smolts as an input factor has been taken. In other words, the optimal decision can
occur in two stages. First, the farmer allocates resources between smolts and the
group of other factors, then he decides on optimal factor intensities within the
subgroup of other factors. This means that the pairwise marginal rates of technical
substitution between the other factors are independent of the quantity of smolts as
an input or that the slope of the isoquant in the labor-feed space is not affected by
what is going on in the smolts space (Woodland, 1978, Chambers, 1988). Hence,
there is a rationale for modelling this production process where the other input
factors are weakly separable from smolts as an input factor (Berndt and Chris-
tensen, 1973).'
In accordance with the Fish Farming License Act, each plant is regulated in
the use of pen volume measured in cubic meters. For our data period, the volume
restriction varies depending on the date of license issue. Since size restriction is
a major focus of our interest in assessing the effects of regulation, some further
comments are required. The government's main objective for regulating size is to
achieve a regional allocation of farms (Stortingsmelding (Report to Parliament)
No. 65, 1986-87). By putting a ceiling on the size, which leads to many relatively
small units, a distributive mechanism is invoked to maintain the pattern of scat-
tered settlement along the Norwegian coast. The regulation of the farm is given in
cubic meters of water volume to rear fish, or the pen volume. The prevailing limit
is 12,000 m^ of pen volume. The upper size limit of a farm has been changing from
the first license act of 1973 until today, ranging from 1,000 m^ to 12,000 m^. Our
sample from 1982/83 includes farms which were restricted to 1,000-8,000 m^ cubic
meters. Moreover, some farms established before 1973, when the law was en-
acted, are included in our sample and some were considerably above 8,000 m^, but
they were also restricted in their production capacity as they were not allowed to
expand beyond the capacity they had in 1973. In 1987 all existing farms and new
farms entering the industry were allowed to expand their size to 12,000 m'.
Hence, our data sets from 1982 and 1983 are convenient for the purpose of as-
sessing distortions of governmental regulation of capacity since the data sets
comprise farms regulated at different capacity levels. Since capacity is regulated
it is possible to consider the regulated water volume as a given factor of produc-
tion for a single farmer, causing the farmer to adjust his production plan given the
volume constraint (different for farmers) in pen capacity."*
tions of technology in fisheries since it has serious implications for fisheries regulations
(Squires, 1987a, 1987b).
^ Alternatively, it is possible to consider the fanner's economic decision in the beginning
of a normal year with a given amount of smolts in the pens. The input of smolts is fixed
during the production period, but it is variable between production periods. Hence, the
farmer must determine the optimal mix of the remaining inputs given the smolts in the
beginning of the year and a short-run transformation function is appropriate with smolts as
a given factor of production.
'* A different way of formulating a production model where capacity is regulated, is to
assume that regulating the volume of water is tantamount to regulating the level of pro-
duction. In that case, it is not necessary to specify a separate factor for capacity.54 Salvanes
From the discussion above and the fact that other intermediate inputs than
feed were excluded both because of the dominant role of feed and the relative
unimportance of other intermediate inputs (and because of lacking data on quan-
tities of the intermediate inputs), the following parsimonious and more precise
production function for salmon aquaculture can be specified:
y = f(xL, Xp; XK) (2)
where the included inputs are assumed to be weakly separable from smolts and
capacity is specified as a given factor of production. The capacity variable also
represents the capital equipment of capacity.^
Methodology and Empirical Model
If we assume that the aquaculture firm is a price taker in input markets and
minimizes costs, it is more convenient to work with the cost function represen-
tation of technology for empirical testing. Given the nature of capacity regulation
in water volume for rearing salmon, it would be unrealistic to assume that aqua-
culture farms adjust their capacity to the cost minimizing level. Hence, an appro-
priate representation of the technology is a variable or restricted cost function
with capacity as a fixed factor.^ The restricted minimum cost function dual to the
transformation function in (2), can be written:^
VC = VC(y, WL, Wp; K) (3)
where w,{i = L,F) are factor prices corresponding to the variable inputs labor and
feed. VC = 2J=L F ^iXj, i.e., the minimum expenditures,on variable factors given
the fixed factor, the fixed factor is defined as the regulated capacity of a salmon
aquaculture firm given in cubic meters of water volume. To estimate the cost
function given in (3) a functional form is required. The translog functional form of
the restricted cost function is specified which allows a fiexibility in the estimation
offish farming technology (Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau, 1973). Furthermore,
However, when both the possible effects on the allocation of variable factors of production
and on scale adjustment are addressed, a restricted transformation function is preferred.
' It would have been preferable to incorporate both regulated capacity and capital as a
separate input either as a given factor of production or as a variable factor. However, the
capacity in pen volume is also a good proxy for the stock of physical capital and it is
reasonable to interpret the regulated capacity as the capital equipment for farming. Incor-
porating into the model two highly correlated measures of capital could lead to severe
multicoUinearity problems in estimation. Furthermore, it might be a good idea to have a
separate capital variable representing the living stock offish as a part of capital, however
it is impossible to separate out the living stock of fish from the aggregate capital measure
from the present data set.
* The restricted cost and profit functions were developed by Lau (1976) and McFadden
(1978) and early applications include Brown and Christensen (1981) and Atkinson and
Halvorsen (1976).
' See Varian (1984) and Fuss and McFadden (1978) for the relationship between a primal
and a dual approach and for instance Binswanger (1974) for the econometric rationale for
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by specifying the restricted cost function and estimating it via a flexible functional
form, it will be possible to test the production properties of the aquaculture
production process in general. It will also be possible, more specifically, to mea-
sure the effects of changed incentives for aquaculture farms' use of inputs result-
ing from governmental regulation of pen volume. The following representation of
the translog cost function is an approximation of the cost function in equation (3):
ln VC = ao + 3y ln y + 2 Pi 1" wi + 3K In K + 1/2 3yy (ln
i = L,F
3yi In y In Wi + PyK ln y ln K + 1/2 ^ 2 Py •" wi ln Wj
i = L,Fj = L,F
3iK In Wi In K + 1/2 3KK (In K)^ (4)
i = L,F
where y is output level, WL and Wp are input prices and K is regulated capacity of
pen volume and py, Pj, p^, Py, p^, PKK> PIK. Pyy and PyK are parameters to be
estimated. Since we interpret the translog function as an approximation to the true
underlying cost function with the sample mean as the point of approximation,
each exogenous variable is divided by its sample mean prior to taking the natural
logarithms. Thus, the transformed variables are all equal to zero when evaluated
at the sample mean. This facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients
in that all first-order coefficients in equation (4) are interpretable as cost elastic-
ities evaluated at the sample mean or for the mean firm. For instance the cost
elasticities with respect to factor prices, PL and Pp, are equivalent to the shares of
total costs and Py is interpreted as the short-run cost-elasticity with respect to
output or 1/Py the short-run measure of economies of scale for the mean firm.
Furthermore, the second-order parameters may be interpreted as measuring the
effect of the respective variables have on the cost elasticities as observations
depart from our chosen point of approximation, i.e., from a hypothetical mean
firm. These interpretations will be important when testing the effect of regulated
capacity on costs.
Symmetry requires that Py = Pjj, and the following restrictions are implied by
the neoclassical property that a cost function must be homogenous of degree one
in input price:
Pij = 0, S Pij = 0, 2 Pyi = 0, 2 PiK = 0 (5)
J
Both these restrictions must hold in order to represent a well-behaved technology
and will be tested for using a log of likelihood ratio test (Kmenta, 1986). Additional
regularity conditions to be tested for are monotonicity and a convex technology in
inputs. Monotonicity, i.e., the requirement that the cost function is an increasing
function in input prices, will be met if the first-order price terms are positive. A
convex technology implies that the Hessian matrix of the variable factors is neg-
ative semidefinite and that the first-order term for the quasi-fixed factor is nega-56 Salvanes
tive or zero (Binswanger, 1974, Chambers, 1988). These tests will also be under-,
taken for the point of expansion of the translog function.
The cost function will be estimated together with the share equations. Shep-
ard's lemma (1953), ac/awj, implies that the input shares (S;) can be obtained for
the translog case as:
WjXi
i = (aVC/awi)(Wi/VC) = :;^ = Sj
= pi + Piylny + 2 Pijinwj -I- PiRlnK (6)
One of the share equations, the labor share, has been deleted to overcome the
problem of singularity in the covariance matrix. Additive disturbance terms are
appended to the cost function and the cost share and efficient parameter estimates
are obtained by using the iterative Zellner (1962) technique. The resulting esti-
mates are asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates and they
are invariant to which share equation is deleted (Barten, 1969).
Measures of Cost of Regulation
Since we in this paper focus on the effects of governmental regulation of pen
rearing capacity on cost of production of aquaculture farms, we will in this section
present how the cost of regulation can be estimated by providing different mea-
sures of regulation costs which can be retrieved from the estimated parameters of
the restricted cost function.
A priori one can expect two main effects on economic performance when a
factor of production—in particular the production capacity—is regulated. One
important effect concerns variable costs through misallocation of variable factors
of production. The explanation is that the individual farm will expand its produc-
tion along the short-run cost curves instead of along its long-run cost curves due
to the capacity restriction when output is increased. The reason for this to be
possible is that farms can to a certain degree overcome the capacity constraint by
having a higher density of fish in the pens; the production level itself is not
regulated, only the water volume capacity. This will be revealed as a displacement
effect on the cost curve. Hence, we will expect that the given factor does have an
effect of increasing variable costs in equation (3) or as specified in equation (4),
but probably not an equal effect for all farms independent of how large their given
capacity is. Furthermore, if this effect is important it is also expected that a
measure of scale economies will be biased when estimating a long-run cost func-
tion in which the effect of a fixed factor is not incorporated. The second effect is
a possible underutilization of gains from scale economies since capacity—the
given factor—is not allowed to adjust along the long-run cost function. This is an
effect that concerns optimal adjustment of capacity and has to do with the total
cost function.
To assess the effects of regulated capacity on the cost of production in aqua-
culture, we start out by testing whether capacity as a given factor belongs in the
specification of the cost function. This is undertaken by a log of likelihood ratioCost of Public Regulation in Fish Farming 57
test (Kmenta, 1986). Then we continue to examine the specific effect on input
allocation. Since we have normalized all the exogenous variables in the translog
cost function to the point of approximation (the sample mean), the estimated
parameters are interpreted as point estimates of the cost elasticities for the hy-
pothetical mean firm. The point elasticity for the mean firm of cost with respect
to capacity, e^K, is PK in equation (4), and it is expected a priori to be positive
since regulated capacity is expected to increase variable costs at any output level.
The more general measure of cost elasticity of capacity—when the possibility of
a non-homothetic production process is included—is:
ecK(y,K,w) = PK + pKK lnK + ^ PiRln Wi -f- PyK lny (7)
Homotheticity will be tested for and both measures of cost elasticity of capacity
will be reported.^ Furthermore, it is expected that the effect on variable costs will
be less important as the given capacity is larger i.e., plants with a regulated
capacity larger than average will have a weaker incentive to utilize variable costs
too intensively. The second-order coefficients of the cost function, P^K, provides
important information in this respect on the effects of regulation on variable costs.
If this parameter is significantly different from zero and has a negative sign, it
means that the cost elasticity of capacity regulation decreases as capacity is above
average.
To assess the effect on the use and possible misallocation of variable factors in
more detail, we can retrieve the effect of capacity on the demand for the variable
factors from the parameters of equation (4). The parameters PpK and PLK measure
whether the shares of feed and labour are altered when the capacity is increased,
respectively. A priori at least one of these is expected to be negative, meaning that
when capacity is increased the variable cost is decreased; capacity is variable
factor saving. This is in accordance with the argument above that one effect of
regulating capacity is that the variable factors are too intensively used when
capacity is too small and hence increasing capacity leads to variable factor saving,
i.e., the fixed factor and the variable factors are substitutes.
If these effects are important, it is also expected that a measure of scale
economies will be biased when estimating a long-run cost function where the
effect of a fixed factor is not taken into account (Caves, Christensen and Swan-
son, 1981, Nelson, 1985, Schankerman and Nadiri, 1986). The long-run returns to
scale measure can be retrieved from a restricted cost function via the following
expression as':
* Homotheticity implies that all isoquants have the same shape as the unit isoquant, i.e.,
the factor ratios are constant and independent of the level of output and when a restricted
cost function is specified, also independent of the fixed factor of production.
* The scale elasticity is evaluated at the actual value of the fixed factor in this case as
suggested by Braeutigam and Daughety (1983) and Caves, Christensen and Swanson
(1981). However, Nelson (1985) as well as Schankerman and Nadiri (1986), suggest that the
optimal level of the fixed factor, K*, should be utilized and they suggest different ap-
proaches to retrieve the optimal level of the fixed factor where the idea basically is to use
the input price. In our case, K is regulated and does not have a market price and the
observed regulated value had to be used.55 Salvanes
RTS = (1 - d\n VC/aln K)/(aln VC/dln y) (8)
and in terms of the parameters of the translog case given in equation (4), the
elasticity of scale for the mean firm can be expressed as:
RTS = (1 - PKVPV (9)
The short-run returns to scale measure, i.e., returns to variable factors of pro-
duction, will be expressed by the inverse cost elasticity of output, 1/Py. The
economies of scale elasticity given in equation (9) will be compared to an equiv-
alent returns to scale measure from estimation of a long-run translog function
utilizing the same data set (Salvanes, 1989). Hence, it is possible to test whether
a specification error is important. In this case the error lies in failing to specify
regulated capacity as a fixed factor of production.
The Data Set and Variable Definitions
The data base was provided by the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries and con-
sisted of two cross-sectional data sets of micro data on annual production and
costs for 1982 and 1983. Micro data for grow-out salmon farms for 91 individual
plants was received for 1982, out of a population of 328, and 110 observations
were received for 1983, when the total number of farms was 362. All size groups
and all regions along the Norwegian coast were included in the data sets. Envi-
ronmental and regional effects were impossible to incorporate since data did not
exist.
To properly estimate the restricted cost function for the industry defined in
equation (4), five primary variables are required, i.e., output level, wage rate, feed
price, regulated capacity level and variable costs. The following definitions were
utilized. Output is defined as an index of production of salmon and trout in tons
consisting of tons harvested and the change in stock of living fish. The change of
stock is calculated as the difference between the stock of living fish from the
beginning of one year to the end of the year. The wage rate is calculated as an
index consisting of the wage for hired labor (totEil expenditure divided by total
hours of work) plus a derived wage rate for self-employment and family labor. The
feed price was defined as the annual expenses divided by output produced. Since
we did not have quantity figures for feed use this proxy had to be specified. The
rationale for this input price is that there exists a relationship between output of
fish and the quantity of feed required, the feed conversion ratio (Bj0mdal, 1988).
There is no reason to believe that there should be systematic error in using this
proxy of importance for assessing cost differences between small and large farms.
A summary of the statistics for the main variables is provided in Table 1.
The regulated capacity is defined as described in the second section as the
regulated capacity in cubic meters of water volume, and the mean sizes in 1982
and 1983 were 5,700 m^ and 6,200 m', respectively.Cost of Public Regulation in Fish Farming 59
Table 1
Summary Statistics of Cross Sectional Data for the Norwegian Aquacuiture
Industry, 1982 and 1983.1
Output Feed Price Wage Rate Variable Costs
(tons) (index) (index) (1,000 Nok)
Year Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
^982 83,733 80,981 1L50 IIMO 53^40 14^89 1362.2 1599.0
1983 93,892 108,040 11.60 7.40 61.1 27.15 1632.4 1467.3
All variables are inflated to 1983-values using a general price index from the Norwegian Central
Bureau of Statistics (Statistical Yearbook, 1985).
Empirical Result
Estimates of the restricted cost function parameters are given in Table 2, esti-
mated with symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in input prices imposed.
Production theory requires certain curvature conditions to hold for the esti-
mated cost function. Homogeneity and symmetry were tested by performing log
of likelihood tests. It was not possible to invert the data matrix for the complete
unconstrained model and thus the symmetry condition could not be tested. Sym-
metry was imposed and homogeneity of degree one was tested against the model
with symmetry imposed. The hypothesis of linear homogeneity could not be re-
jected. To ensure monotonicity positive coefficients of the first-order price terms
are sufficient at the sample mean, and this is fulfilled here; PL = 0-30 and Pp =
0.70. The Hessian matrix was retrieved by calculating the principle minors at the
Table 2
Estimation of a Restricted Cost Function
for the Norwegian Aquacuiture Industry




















































Own-price elasticities and elasticity of substitution at the sample
mean for a restricted cost function for the Norwegian
aquaculture industry.'
Own-price elasticity Elasticity of substitution
Feed -0.48(0.17)* i 57 m Sfi^*
Labour -1.14(0.44)* "^^"^ ^
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses calculated using the formula for the vari-
ance of a random variable which is a nonlinear function of several random variables.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
point of expansion and was negative semidefinite.'" However, the quasi-fixed
factor is positive and thus convexity of the restricted cost function in the fixed
factor is not ensured.
The conditional own-price elasticities calculated as
£.. = (8Xi)/(Xi)/(8Wi)/(Wi) = (Pii)/(Si) + Si - 1, i = F,L, and conditional AUen-
Uzawa cross-price elasticities derived as tJij = (8Xi)/(Xi)/(8Wj)/(Wj) = (Pij)/(SiSj) +
l,ij = F,L."
Because the elasticities of demand are functions of the cost shares, they will
vary across the sample. The data is scaled so that the means of the prices are equal
to one. Hence, the estimated first-order price terms are equal to the predicted or
fitted cost shares at means, and in the formulas for elasticities given above, the Si,
are replaced by the first-order terms. In Table 3 the elasticities at means are
presented accompanied by their standard errors. The standard errors are calcu-
lated by a first-order Taylor series expansion to the variance (Kmenta, 1986).'^
The own-price elasticities are of the correct sign according to factor demand
theory. Moreover, the elasticities are all significantly different from zero at the 5
percent significance level. We notice that the factors of production are quite
insensitive to own-price changes and a very stable feeding pattern is indicated.
Furthermore, labor and feed are found to be substitutes.'^ One way of interpreting
this substitution relationship is that an increase in feed price could lead to incen-
'" The Hessian matrix for the translog cost function is defined in terms of the estimated
coefficients and the cost shares as follows (Antle and Aitah, 1983):
F + SL SF PLL +
" Both the own-price and substitution elasticities are conditional and partial (Allen) elas-
ticities. They are conditioned both on the level of output (measured along the isoquant) and
on the given level of the fixed factor. Thus the elasticities may be interpreted as short-run
elasticities since nothing is happening vis the quasi-fixed factor.
'^ See Krinsky and Robb (1986, 1990) for a discussion of this approximation to calculating
the standard errors. The conclusion in their most recent paper supports the approximation
technique utilized in this paper when calculating standard errors.
'^ This is a result of using only two variable inputs. However, in a specification where more
than two variable inputs were included, labor and feed were found to be substitutes (Sal-
vanes, 1989).Cost of Public Regulation in Fish Farming 61
tives to reduce feed expenditure by changing the husbandry scheme to more hand
feeding, thus economizing on feed use.
Regulation and Variable Factor Use
A likelihood ratio test was first performed to test if the regulated capacity is an
explanatory variable in the cost function and thus affecting the cost of production
of salmon farming. The null hypothesis of no effect of regulated capacity was
rejected at the 1% significance level where the calculated x^ = 34.12 compared to
the theoretical value of x^ = 13.28. Hence, a restricted cost function is the
preferred cost function specification for this industry incorporating regulated ca-
pacity as a fixed factor, and public regulation in terms of a capacity constraint
does affect the costs of producing market sized salmon in Norway.
The elasticity of cost with respect to capacity, CCK = PK = 010, means that
variable costs are affected at all farm sizes of the reguiated capacity. This is
supported by calculating the cost elasticity of regulation incorporating the non-
homogeneous production process, as calculated by equation (7), gave CCK (y,K,w)
= 0.11. The Chi-square value corresponding to the null hypothesis of homothe-
ticity for the likelihood ratio test, x^ = 78.13, is significantly different at the 1%
significance level and the null hypothesis is rejected.'"* However, since the sec-
ond-order term in capacity, PKK, is negative, the cost effect of regulation is
decreasing as farm size rises above average farm size. This is as expected a pr/on,
since larger farms are expected to have less incentive to use variable costs to
increase the level of production than the smaller farms. The origin of this argu-
ment is that given the different pen volume limits, the individual farm will adjust
along the short-run cost curve when expanding its capacity until its marginal costs
and marginal revenue are equalized. In 1982/83, which is our data period, large
rents or quasi-rents appeared in the Norwegian salmon fanning industry (Profit-
ability study for Norwegian fish farming, 1982, 1983 (L0nsemdunders0kingar for
matfiskoppdrett)).'^ Hence, there was a strong incentive for individual farms to
try to exploit that rent by expanding their production. However, it is reasonable
to expect the larger farms to have a weaker incentive for expanding production
since they probably are closer to optimum capacity and some of the larger farms
were actually able to freely choose their capacity level when first established.
In order to be able to increase production when pen volume is given, a higher
density offish in the pens is necessary. This implies a higher intensity of variable
input factors. When assessing the possible effect on variable factor utilization of
regulation, by the point estimate of the elasticity of capacity on demand for
variable factors, PJK, i = L,F, we notice that PLK is negative. This means that
labor is saved when capacity is increased, which implies that labor is more inten-
sively used by farms with below average capacity. However, the effect on feed
has the opposite direction, ppK is positive. As noticed from Table 3, the own-price
'" The parameters tested for the restricted cost function specified in equation (4) are B =
0 Vi, i = L,F and ^Ky = 0.
'^ Rent is interpreted in the usual way, as extra profit from exploiting natural resources,
which in this case is the use of locations for sea farming. And quasi rent is extra profit from
other unpaid input factors, e.g., entry regulation as in this industry, a particularly good
infrastructure for salmon farming in Norway etc.62 Salvanes
elasticity of feed is very low, indicating that feed is difficult to substitute for
pen-volume or capital equipment. This makes sense since higher capacity also
means more fish produced, which of course requires more material input in terms
of feed. Labor, on the other hand, is a variable input which is more easily sub-
stituted as shown by the results given in Table 3.
These results indicate some effect of misallocation of variable factors of pro-
duction caused by public regulation. This can also be supported by the elasticity
of scale calculated from equation (9), when capacity is properly incorporated in
the cost function, when comparing it to the elasticity of scale from an estimated
total cost function utilizing the same data set (Salvanes, 1989). In the latter case,
the average scale elasticity was measured to e = 1.18, from equation (9), utilizing
parameter estimates from Table 2, it is 1.08 for the mean firm.'^ Thus, the elas-
ticity of scale is slightly overestimated when a long-run cost function is specified.
In this case, as one would expect when the regulation effect on the variable inputs
is not taken into account. The reason for expecting economies of scale to be
overestimated a priori when regulated capacity is not incorporated properly, can
be outlined as follows. In the case of the regulated Norwegian aquaculture indus-
try, some of the difference in cost efficiency between small and large farms is due
to economies of scale and some is due to misallocation of variable inputs caused
by capacity regulation. By estimating a long-run cost function not specifying the
regulated pen-volume as a fixed factor of production, the combined efficiency
difference as measured by the average cost curve, will be captured in the esti-
mated equation and interpreted only as caused by economies of scale. It will
therefore be overstated and provide an upward biased scale effect. As the re-
stricted cost function is properly defined and estimated, the efficiency difference
between small and large aquaculture farms will be split between an economies of
scale effect of regulated capacity and an effect of misallocation of variable factors
of production.'^
Conclusion
In this study a restricted or variable cost function has been specified and esti-
mated for the Norwegian aquaculture industry in order to assess the effects of
public regulation on variable input allocation. To measure the effects of regulated
capacity on costs, elasticities of capacity regulation have been derived and esti-
mated.
The results indicate that regulated capacity belongs in the cost function for the
industry and that it affects costs of production in the industry. Variable inputs are
shown to be more intensively used for farms which are most heavily regulated.
Furthermore, by comparing results concerning economies of scale properties es-
'* The cost function in Salvanes (1989) is TC = TC(y, WL, WR, Wp), where the price of
capital is included. Hence, one could argue that the elasticity of scale from this specifica-
tion of technology is not comparable to the present result. However, when estimating VC
= VC(y, WL, WK, Wp, K), the derived elasticity of scale is 1.03, indicating an even larger
upward bias when the regulated input is not included.
'"'The focus in study has been on the cost of regulation in terms of inefficiency particularly
in terms of factor misallocation. However, there are also other costs to the public when
regulating the fish fanning industry which are not addressed here. These costs include the
extra expenditure in terms of a bureaucracy to handle the Fish Farming License Act.Cost of Public Regulation in Fish Farming 63
timated from a total long-run cost function and the present restricted cost func-
tion, an upward bias of scale economies was indicated for the total cost function
approach. The reason is that a total cost function approach did not properly
distinguish between a regulation effect on cost efficiency between small and large
farms and an effect due to economies of scale in the industry, but assigned both
effects to a difference in economies of scale.
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